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LABOR LAW-State Court Jurisdiction Over Employee's
Damage Action Against Union for Failure To
Process Fully Grievance Is Not Pre-empted
by the NLRB-Sipes v. Vaca*
Plaintiff, discharged by his employer on the ground that he was
no longer physically able to work, enlisted the aid of his union to
contest the dismissal. Under the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the union and the employer, the union was
to seek redress of employee complaints by means of a five step
grievance procedure, with arbitration as the final step. The union
processed plaintiff's grievance without success through the first four
steps of the procedure, but refused to take the issue to the arbitral
level. Plaintiff brought suit against the union in a Missouri county
circuit court, claiming damages sustained as a result of the union's
"arbitrary" and "capricious" refusal to process fully his grievance. 1
The jury awarded actual and punitive damages, but the court set
aside the verdict on the ground that the jurisdiction of the state
court had been pre-empted by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB). The Kansas City Court of Appeals affirmed. 2 On appeal
to the Missouri Supreme Court, held, reversed and jury verdict reinstated. A discharged employee's suit against his union based upon
its wrongful refusal to process fully his grievance is a purely internal
union matter, and, as such, is not subject to pre-emption by the
NLRB.
The United States Supreme Court has derived from section 9 of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which grants to a majority union powers of exclusive representation, a duty on the part of
the union "to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf
of all whom it represents." 3 This statutory duty of fair representation, although occasionally supplemented by common law concepts
of tort or contract,4 has become the individual employee's primary
• 397 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1965) [hereinafter referred to as principal case].
I. Plaintiff claimed that the union officials arbitrarily and wrongfully demanded
$l!OO from him before they would carry his grievance to the fifth step. The union
denied that such a demand had been made and asserted that the grievance had been
dropped in good faith for lack of adequate medical evidence.
2. Owens v. Vaca, 51 CCH Lab. Cas. 1[ 19613 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965). While appeal to
the Missouri Supreme Court was pending, plaintiff died and his administrator replaced him as plaintiff.
3. Steele v. Louisville & N. Ry., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944).
4. Prior to the birth of the § 9 theory, the union's duty of fair representation was
construed by the courts in terms of various common law concepts. Employees were
described as third party beneficiaries under the bargaining contract, as principals in
an agency relation with the union, and as cestuis que trustent to whom a fiduciary
duty was owed by the trustee union. Although today, federal law probably dominates
the area of individual rights in the bargaining process, the states are not bound to
a § 9 interpretation of the duty and the field has not been formally pre-empted.
See Rosen, Fair Representation, Contract Breach and Fiduciary Obligations: Unions,
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protection against arbitrary or discriminatory union activity.11 The
alleged conduct of the defendant union in the principal case-failure to represent fairly a member in the grievance procedure-constituted a clear-cut breach of this duty. 6 Thus, the fundamental
question presented by the principal case is whether an individual
employee, aggrieved by his union's breach of its duty of fair representation, may sue the union for damages in a state judicial forum
or whether such an action is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the NLRB.
The general rule which defines the respective jurisdictions of
the courts and the NLRB was enunciated by the Supreme Court in
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon.1 In Garmon, the
Court held that in order to avoid judicial interference with national
labor policy, the state and federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the NLRB whenever the activity which is the
subject matter of litigation is arguably prohibited by section 8 or
protected by section 7 of the NLRA. Until recently, an application
of this general rule to the facts in the principal case would have resulted in the sustaining of state court jurisdiction. Traditionally,
a union's breach of its duty of fair representation was not considered
to constitute activity prohibited by section 8 of the NLRA.8 In
Union Officials and the Worker in Collective Bargaining, 15 HAsnNcs L.J. 891, 895-99
(1964). However, if the Miranda theory, see notes 11-20 infra and accompanying text,
or the § 301 theory, see notes 43-50 infra and accompanying text, are ultimately fully
accepted, state law may become obsolete in the area.
5. The statutory duty of fair representation originated in cases involving the Railway Labor Act. See, e.g., Tunstall v. .Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 828 U.S.
210 (1944); Steele v. Louisville &: N. Ry., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Subsequently, the
duty was found in § 9 of the NLRA on the rationale that the power of exclusive
representation conferred by that section on the unions could not be absolute but
must be limited by a fiduciary obligation to wield the power with fairness to all. See
Syres v. Local 123, Oilworkers Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U.S. 330 (1953); Hardcastle v. Western Greyhound Lines, 303 F.2d 182, 185
(9th Cir. 1962); Durandetti v. Chrysler Corp., 195 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
See generally Blum.rosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative
and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MICH. L. REY. 1485, 151920 (1963); Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REY. 151 (1957); Hanslowe,
The Collective Agreement and the Duty of Fair Representation, 14 LAB. L.J. 1052
(1963); Summexs, Individual Rights in Collective Bargaining Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 862 (1962); Comment, Federal Protection of Individual Rights
Under Labor Contracts, 73 YALE L.J. 1215 (1964). But cf. Humphrey v. Moore, 875
U.S. 335 (1964), wherein the Supreme Court indicates that the duty is derived from
the collective bargaining agreement.
6. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 343 (1964); Mendicki v. UAW, 61
L.R.R.M. 2142 (D. Kan. 1965); Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 1215, 1219 (1964).
7. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
8. Section 8(b)(l) of the NLRA designates as an unfair labor practice union
conduct that restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights. But,
because § 7 was not considered to contain a right of fair representation, § S(b)(l) did
not reach a union's arbitrary treatment of its members. Section 8(b)(2) prohibits union
action which causes an employer to discriminate against an employee. However, the
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fact, the NLRB itself had expressly denied that such a breach was an
unfair labor practice over which it could exercise jurisdiction.9
Thus, responsibility for protecting the individual employee against
arbitrary or invidious union action rested exclusively with the state
and federal courts. 10
·
In 1962, in Miranda Fuel Co., 11 the NLRB reversed its earlier
position and held that a union's breach of its duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice.12 Specifically, the Board decided
that section S(b)(l) of the NLRA prohibits a union from taking
action against its members on considerations that are arbitrary,
irrelevant, or invidious. 13 Subsequent NLRB decisions expressly excourts require that the discrimination involved be of such a nature that it would
encourage or discourage union membership. This was usually construed to mean
that the discriminatory conduct had to be based upon union-connected activity. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Local 294, Teamsters Union, 317 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1963). Thus, the broad
area of union arbitrary or invidious action toward members not based upon union
membership was outside the scope of the federal labor laws. It was this type of union
action which was involved in the principal case.
9. In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953), the NLRB filed an amicus
curiae brief in which it argued that the Board did not have jurisdiction over fair
representation cases.
10. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 294, Teamsters Union, 317 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1963);
Durrandetti v. Chrysler Corp., 195 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. Mich. 1961); Berman v. National
Maritime Union, 166 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). See also Blumrosen, supra note 5, at
1470-72, 1504; Rosen, supra note 4, at 395-409; Sovern, Section JOI and the Primary
Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HARv. L. REv. 529, 548 (1963); cf. Hiller v. Local 2,
Liquor Salesmen's Union, 338 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1964).
11. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962). A union member had been absent from work because
of illness. Although the absence was excusable, the union demanded that the employer
reduce the member's seniority. The employer acquiesced to this demand and the member filed unfair labor practice charges against both the union and the employer.
12. The Board's change of attitude toward fair representation cases, see note 9
supra and accompanying text, may be attributed to the fact that the courts had
proven to be an unsatisfactory forum for the protection of individual rights in the
collective bargaining process. The Supreme Court had developed a broad standard of
fairness, Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953), which the lower courts had
applied with a heavy presumption in favor of union reasonableness, thereby virtually
precluding a finding of a breach of its duty. Other prohibitive factors were the time,
expense and procedural problems involved in a judicial action. See Blumrosen, supra
note 5, at 1470-72, 1514-15; Herring, The Fair Representation Doctrine: An Effective
Weapon against Racial Discrimination, 24 MD. L. REv. 113 (1964); Rosen, Fair Repre-

sentation, Contract Breach and Fiduciary Obligations; Unions, Union Officials and
the Worker in Collective Bargaining, 15 HAsTINGS L.J. 391, 399-409 (1964); Rosen,
Individual Worker in the Grievance Procedure, Still Another Look at the Problem, 24
MD. L. REv. 233, 286-89 (1964). For discussion of a series of New York decisions that
effectively cut off the individual's recourse to the judicial forum, see Hanslowe, supra
note 5, at 1054-58.
13. The revolutionary aspect of the Board's holding is that it entailed reading into
§ 7 of the NLRA a duty of fair representation. See note 8 supra. Section 7 gives
workers the right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.
Section 9 had formerly been construed to impose on the unions a duty to act fairly
on behalf of all their members. Reading the two sections together, the Board concluded that implicit in the § 7 right to bargain collectively is a right to bargain
through representatives who will be bound by a duty of fairness. Thus, the union's
duty of fair representation became a § 7 protected right. Since § 8(b)(l) prohibits
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tended this theory to reach the type of union activity involved in
the principal case: arbitrary or discriminatory refusal to process a
grievance. 14 Thus, if the Miranda rationale were applied to the
principal case, the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim would
arguably be an unfair labor practice, and, as such, subject to the
pre-emptive rule of Garmon. The Board's new theory, however, has
not yet been generally construed by the courts as necessitating a
strict rule of pre-emption in all fair representation cases.15 The Supreme Court has on three occasions noted the existence of Miranda,
but each time it has expressly refused to pass upon its validity.16
Theoretically, until the Supreme Court ultimately rules on Miranda,
the lower courts may avoid its pre-emptive implications by relying
restraint of § 7 rights, it was an easy second step to find that any breach of the duty
of fair representation is a violation of § 8(b)(l) and consequently an unfair labor
practice. For a discussion of the implications of Miranda, see generally Murphy, The
Duty of Fair Representation under Taft-Hartley, 30 Mo. L. REv. 373 (1965); Comment,
73 YALE L.J. 1215, 1234-38 (1964); Comment, 45 B.U.L. REv. 141 (1965).
In deciding whether a union has, in fact, breached its duty, the Board will look
to the true purpose of the union's actions. If the true purpose is deemed legitimate,
incidental injurious effects on a particular member's rights will not be sufficient to
establish a breach. See Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 1965 CCH NLRB 11 9760. The union
must make an honest effort to serve all fairly without hostile discrimination to any,
but the union must also be allowed a wide range of reasonableness within which to
carry out its duties as bargaining agent. See Local 12, United Rubber ·workers Union,
150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964). Applying this broad standard of fairness, the Board has been
reluctant to find that a union's actions were sufficiently arbitrary or irrelevant to
constitute a breach of duty. See, e.g., Local 10, Chicago Fed'n of Musicians, 1965 CCH
NLRB 11 9456; Local 87, Houston Typographical Union, 145 N.L.R.B. 1657 (1964);
Local 820, Armored Car Chauffers &: Guards Union, 145 NL.R.B. 225 (1963); Local 6,
New York Typographical Union, 144 N.L.R.B. 1555 (1963). But see Local 12, Rubber
Workers Union, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964); Local 1, Metal Workers Union, 147 N.L.R.B.
1573 (1964).
14. Local 1, Metal Workers Union (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964);
Local 12, Rubber Workers Union, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964). In both cases, Negro employees charged their union with having discriminatively refused to process their
grievances. See generally Sherman, Union's Duty of Fair Representation and the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 49 MINN. L. REV. 771 (1965); Comment, 45 B.U.L. REv. 141 (1965).
Subsequent board applications of the Miranda theory have made it clear that the
theory is not confined to racial discrimination cases. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 1965
CCH NLRB 11 9760; Local 10, Chicago Fed'n of Musicians, 1965 CCH NLRB 11 9456.
15. The Board's order in Miranda was denied enforcement by the Second Circuit.
NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). Of the three judges writing
opinions, only one expressly rejected the Board's reasoning. Cf. NLRB v. Local 294,
Teamsters Unioi;i, 317 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1963). But see Cafero v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 115
(2d Cir. 1964). The Board has made it clear that it will continue to follow Miranda
until the Supreme Court rules otherwise. See Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 1965 CCH NLRB
'J 9760; Local 12, United Rubber Workers Union, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964).
The commentators have not agreed on the legal validity of Miranda or its policy
justification. Compare, e.g., Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 1504-23, Cox, supra note 5,
at 172-73, and Comment, 2 HOUSTON L. REv. 373 (1965) (legislative history as support
for Miranda), with, e.g., Comment, 45 B.U.L. REv. 141 (1965), Comment, 112 U. PA.
L. REv. 711 (1963), Note, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1081 (1965), and Comment, 9 VILL. L. REv.
306 (1964).
16. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965); Humphrey v. Moore,
375 U.S. 335, 344 (1964); Local 100, Plumbers Union v• .Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 696
(1963).
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upon the existing Supreme Court precedents for section 9 judicial
jurisdiction.17 However, in light of the Board's continued adherence
to the Miranda theory, it does seem that a union's breach of its duty
of fair representation should be regarded as, at least, "arguably"
an unfair labor practice.18 There is some judicial authority to this
effect. 19 Particularly relevant to the principal case is Chasis v. Progress Mfg. Co.,20 wherein a federal district court held that the
wrongful refusal of a union to process fully a discharged employee's
grievance was arguably an unfair labor practice and consequently
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.
In the principal case, the Missouri Supreme Court avoided whatever pre-emptive force Miranda may presently have by finding that
the plaintiff's claim fell within an established exception to the general pre-emption doctrine. 21 The Supreme Court has recognized
three such exceptions: (1) when the subject matter of an action in17. See notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text. If the courts follow this approach,
suits brought under § 9 of the NLRA to enforce the duty of fair representation may
become an additional exception to the general pre-emption doctrine. However, the
recent decision of the Supreme Court in Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964),
indicates that the Court itself does not believe that Miranda can be avoided or discredited solely through reliance upon the pre-Miranda precedents for judicial jurisdiction. In Humphrey, the Court found it necessary to construe an action for breach
of the duty of fair representation as one arising under § 301 of the LMRA in order
to by-pass the pre-emption questions raised by Miranda. Had the majority been
willing simply to follow a § 9 theory, as was Mr. Justice Goldberg in dissent, there
would have been no need to create an entirely new construction of§ 301. See Chasis v.
Progress Mfg. Co., 54 CCH Lab. Cas. 11 11398 (E.D. Pa. 1966), wherein the court
reasoned that since the § 9 theory had been developed prior to the existence of an
administrative remedy, that theory should now be displaced by the Miranda rationale.
18. The Section on Labor Relations Law of the American Bar Association reported in 1965 that:
violations of the duty of fair representation are arguably subject to sections
7 or 8 of the Act. • • • [C]onsequently, unless court actions brought to enforce
the NLRA's duty of fair representation are exempt from Garmon for some reason,
the courts may no longer entertain them.
Report of the Section of Labor Relations Law, 1964 A.B.A. REP. 147-48 (1965).
19. See Mendicki v. UAW, 61 L.R.R.M. 2142 (D. Kan. 1965); Stout v. Construction
8: Gen. Laborers Council, 226 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ill. 1964); Knox v. UAW, 223 F. Supp.
1009 (E.D. Mich. 1963); Goni-Moral v. Marley, 58 L.R.R.M. 2037 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1964); cf. Young v. United Steelworkers, 420 Pa. 132, 216 A.2d 500 (1966); Mccaul v.
Local 107, Highway Truck-Drivers 8: Helpers Union, 47 CCH Lab. Cas. 11 18137
(Pa. C.P. 1963).
Some judicial support for Miranda may arguably be found in the recent fair
representation cases in which § 301 of the LMRA has been employed to sustain jurisdiction. In relying on § 301 for this purpose the courts appear to be tacitly recognizing the potential pre-emptive force of Miranda. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375
U.S. 335 (1964); Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 355 F.2d 658 (3d Cir. 1966); Mandel
v. Local 707, Teamsters Union, 246 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Tully v. Fred Olson
Motor Serv., 27 Wis. 2d 476, 134 N.W.2d 393 (1965); notes 43-50 infra and accompanying text.
20. 54 CCH Lab. Cas. 11 11398 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
21. The Miranda theory was relied on by the union as grounds for pre-emption.
Sec Brief for Respondents, pp. 18-22. The court apparently rejected this argument:
"[W]c do not think it could reasonably be argued that the conduct of the defendants
constituted an unfair labor practice." Sipes v. Vaca, 397 S.W.2d 658, 665 (Mo. Sup.
Ct. 1965).
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volves union conduct that threatens or constitutes physical violence
or other breaches of the peace; 22 (2) when a suit is brought under
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA); 23 and
(3) when the subject matter of an action is a purely internal union
matter which does not directly involve the employment relation.:? 4
A suit falling within any of these categories is not subject to preemption and may be maintained in a state or federal court even if
the activity involved is concededly protected by section 7 or prohibited by section 8 of the NLRA. 25 In the principal case, judicial
jurisdiction was sustained on the ground that the subject matter of
the suit fell within the third exception to the pre-emption rule. This
exception was originally formulated prior to Garmon, in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales. 26 In Gonzales, an individual
employee, wrongfully expelled from his union, sued the union for
restoration of membership and incidental damages. The Supreme
Court recognized that the union's conduct might conceivably have
constituted an unfair labor practice, but upheld state jurisdiction on
the ground that the danger of conflict with national labor policy was
too remote to justify depriving the plaintiff of a judicial remedy. 21
A year later, when the Court decided Garmon, it described Gonzales as a suit whose subject matter was merely a "peripheral concern of the LMRA," and indicated that such suits would constitute
an exception to the general pre-emption rule. 28 This rather vague
and potentially broad exception was subsequently substantially
limited and given its present narrow definition in Plumber's Union
v. Borden.29 The Borden Court described Gonzales as a
suit focused on purely internal union matters, i.e., on relations between the individual plaintiff and the union, not having to do
22. UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum
Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
23. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371
U.S. 195 (1962).
24. Local 100, Plumbers Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963); International Ass'n
of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
25. See generally Smith & Clark, Reappraisal of the Role of the States in Shaping
Labor Relations Law, 1965 WIS. L. R.Ev. 411, 418-21.
26. 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
27. The state court was empowered to award both reinstatement and damages.
The NLRB could not order reinstatement but might have been able to award back
pay if the union had been found to have wrongfully caused the discharge. See
National Labor Relation Act § IO(c), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
However, even if the board could award back pay, it could not impose punative
damages nor give compensation for mental suffering.
28. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959).
29. 373 U.S. 690 (1963). In Borden, an individual member sued his union for
damages arising from the union's wrongful refusal to refer him for employment. The
member admitted the presence of that which might arguably be an unfair labor
practice but relied on Gonzales to support state jurisdiction. The Court found the
Gonzales rationale inapposite on the ground that the crux of the member's complaint
was interference with employment opportunities, not injury to internal union rights.
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directly with matters of employment, [in which] ... the principal
relief sought was restoration of membership rights. 30
Application of the criteria developed by the Supreme Court in
Borden to the facts of the principal case indicates that the disposition of the plaintiff's claim should not be controlled by the Gonzales
exception. The failure of the union to process fairly the plaintiff's
grievance did deprive him of his rights as a union member and,
to this extent, the suit does directly involve the relationship between
the aggrieved individual and his union. However, the focus of the
plaintiff's claim is not this purely internal union matter. Restoration
of membership rights was not the principal relief sought. Rather,
the petition for relief reveals that the measure of actual damages
claimed against the union is the loss of salary incurred by the plaintiff as a result of his discharge. 31 Thus, the gravamen of the ·complaint is not the denial of membership rights but the resulting injury to the employment status. Clearly, it cannot be maintained, as
would be necessary to satisfy the criteria articulated in Borden,
that the focus of the suit is "the relation between the individual
plaintiff and the union not having directly to do with matters of employment."32
Judicial authority since Borden reinforces the conclusion that
the Gonzales exception is not applicable to the principal case. The
exception has been most frequently invoked as a bar to pre-emption
in cases involving facts essentially similar to those in Gonzales: an
expelled or suspended union member suing the union for damages
or reinstatement. Prior to Borden, Gonzales was generally found
to control such cases.33 In more recent decisions, governed by the
Borden criteria, the courts have refused to apply the exception unless it was absolutely clear that the principal relief sought was restoration of membership rights.34 Consequently, where the expelled
30. Id. at 697. See also Local 207, Int'! Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental
Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963). In Perko, which was decided with Borden,
an individual employee sued his union for damages, claiming that the union had
conspired with his employer to bring about his discharge. Applying the criteria announced in Borden, the Court found that the real focus of the complaint was "interference with the plaintiff's existing or prospective employment relations." Id. at 705.
Thus, the suit was held to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.
31. The complaint initially charged the employer, who was not a defendant, with
having wrongfully discharged the plaintiff, thereby causing the plaintiff to lose earnings totalling $6,500. This same sum was then claimed as the actual damages sustained
by the plaintiff as a result of the union's arbitrary refusal to process fully his grievance. Complaint of Plaintiff, pp. 3-4.
32. Local 100, Plumbers Union v• .Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 697 (1963).
33. See, e.g., .Bussy v. Local 13, Plumbers Union, 286 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1961);
Lockridge v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees, 84
Idaho 201, 369 P.2d 1006 (1962); Lowery v. International .Bhd. of Boilermakers, 241
Miss. 458, 130 So. 2d 831 (1961).
34. Local 2, Int'l Organization of Masters v. International Organization of Masters,
Inc., 414 Pa. 277, 199 A.2d 432 (1964), wherein the expelled members' complaint was
purposely patterned to fall within the modified Gonzales exception. The principal
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member has demanded pecuniary damages as either his sole35 or
primary36 remedy, Gonzales has been rejected. Once beyond the
facts of Gonzales and into the area of fair representation, there appears to be little precedent for applying the doctrine of that case.37
When, as in the principal case, an individual employee has sought
damages for his union's failure to represent him fairly in the grievance procedure, Gonzales has been either rejected or ignored.88
relief sought was restoration of membership rights, and damages were claimed only
as an incidental remedy. The court sustained judicial jurisdiction on the ground
that Gonzales was controlling precedent and that this case fit within its limited confines. But see id. at 285, 199 A.2d at 436 (dissenting opinion arguing that Gonzales is
no longer good authority).
35. Spica v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 420 Pa. 907, 218 A.2d
579 (1966); Directors Guild v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 42, 409 P.2d 934 (1966);
Johnson v. Serbenta, 210 N.E.2d 861 (Ind. Ct. App. 1965); cf. Knox v. UAW, 223
F. Supp. 1009 (E.D. Mich. 1963).
36. See Wax v. International Mailers Union, 400 Pa. 173, 161 A.2d 603 (1960),
in which the expelled member claimed both reinstatement and damages, but the
court refused to follow Gonzales on the ground that the principal relief sought was
compensation for injury to the employment relation. The court declared that
"Gonzales will at most be limited to its facts." Id. at 608. Compare Bussy v. Local 3,
Plumbers Union, 286 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1961) with Bussy v. Local 3, Plumbers Union,
412 P.2d 907 (Colo. Sup. Ct. 1966). When Bussy was originally heard by the Tenth
Circuit, Borden had not yet been decided and the expelled member sought only
damages. The federal court, following Gonzales, sustained judicial jurisdiction. By
the time the suit finally worked its way back up to the Colorado Supreme Court,
Gonzales had been modified by Borden and the plaintiff had accordingly amended
his complaint to add a demand for reinstatement. However, the state court held
that Gonzales would not prevent pre-emption because, despite the last minute amendment, the principal relief sought by the plaintiff was still the damage remedy.
37. In Day v. Northwest Div. 1055, 238 Ore. 624, 389 P.2d 43 (1964), a member sued
his union for damages in a state court, claiming that the union had maliciously procured his discharge. The court held that the state had no jurisdiction, declaring
that "Gonzales which may have supported plaintiff's claim has now been substantially
modified if not overruled by later cases." See Local 207, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963); Union of Operating
Engineers v. Cassida, 358 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). However, there is at
least one area in which the Supreme Court has revived the Gonzales exception and
given it new vitality. In Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966),
the court held in the first of two alternative holdings, that a plant manager's
suit for damages against a union, based upon the union's alleged libel of the plaintiff during an organization campaign, was "merely a peripheral concern of the
LMRA" and thus, not subject to pre-emption by the NLRB. The court did not cite
Gonzales to support its holding but relied upon the dictum in Garmon which exempted matters only peripherally concerned with the LMRA from the general
pre-emption rule therein formulated. Since Linn did not involve union-member relations, it does not directly affect the disposition of the principal case. However, it does
indicate that the exception which originated in Gonzales may not be as narrowly
limited as the Borden decision appeared to suggest. Compare Linn v. United Plant
Guard Workers, supra, with Blum v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 42 N.J. 389,
201 A.2d 46 (1964), wherein the court held that the alleged libelous activity was "not
a peripheral concern as in Gonzales, even assuming that case to have surrived Borden
and Perko."
38. See Mendicki v. UAW, 61 L.R.R.M. 2142 (D. Kan. 1965); Webster v. Midland
Elec. Coal Corp., 43 Ill. App. 2d 359, 193 N.E.2d 212 (1963); Goni-Moral v. Marley, 50
CCH Lab. Cas. 11 51226 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964); Young v. United Steelworkers, 420 Pa.
132, 216 A.2d 500 (1966); McCaul v. Local 107, Teamsters Union, 47 CCH Lab. Cas.
11 18137 (Pa. C.P. 1963); Tully v. Fred Olson Motor Serv., 27 Wis. 2d 476, 134
N.W. 2d 393 (1965); cf. Mengus v. A.C.E. Freight, 53 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 ll237
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Thus, it could be reasonably argued that, as an exception to the
Garmon rule, Gonzales has been limited to its facts.39 However, such
a conclusion is not a prerequisite for determining the inapplicability of the exception to the principal case. It is sufficient to say that
when, as in the principal case, the sole relief sought by an aggrieved
individual against his wrongdoing union is monetary compensation
for injury to his employment status, the Gonzales exception is inapposite.
Since the Missouri Supreme Court was apparently unjustified in
relying upon Gonzales to sustain judicial jurisdiction, the question
of the proper forum for the plaintiff's suit remains open. The Miranda theory would seem to point to exclusive Labor Board jurisdiction. However, it is doubtful, at least from the standpoint of the
individual, that a strict rule of pre-emption in all fair representation cases would be desirable. 40 Of course, the NLRB does offer
several significant advantages: it is less expensive, more expedient
and probably more expert; the common worker, unable to bear the
expense of a lengthy judicial struggle, will be well served by an
available administrative forum. On the other hand, administrative
relief is contingent upon the General Counsel's discretion in issuing
a complaint and, if relief is obtained, it will be narrowly restricted
to an award for back pay. The opportunity offered by the judicial
(Ohio App. 1966). Compare the principal case with Owens v. Vaca, 51 CCH Lab. Cas.
19618 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) (lower court decision in the principal case) wherein the
Gonzales rationale was found inappropriate in light of the Borden modifications. See
Note, M U. Mo. K.C.L. REv. 121 (1966), in which the lower court decision is noted
with approval. But see Bailer v. Local 470, Teamsters Union, 400 Pa. 188, 166 A.2d
343 (1960), cited by the Missouri Supreme Court to support its decision in the
principal case. Bailer is now doubtful authority since it was decided prior to Borden
and has apparently been disapproved in its own state. See Young v. United Steel
Workers, 420 Pa. 132, 216 A.2d 500 (1966); Mccaul v. Local 107, Teamsters Union,
47 CCH Lab. Cas. ,r 18137 (Pa. C.P. 1963). Moreover, the Bailer court did not expressly base its decision upon Gonzales but relied on another Pennsylvania case to
support its decision. Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 400 Pa. 145, 161 A.2d 882 (1960).
Falsetti had dicta to the effect that a member may sue his union for breach of the
duty of fair representation in a state judicial forum. The case was subsequently
retried in the federal courts on a fair representation theory. There, judicial jurisdiction was upheld not on the Gonzales rationale, but on the basis that the suit fell
within § !101 of the LMRA. Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, !155 F.2d 658 (3d Cir. 1966);
see Comment, 26 U. Prrr. L REv. 593, 616·1'1 (1965); notes 43-50 infra and accompany•
ing text.

,r

39. Some support for this contention may be found in the language of the Supreme
Court. See Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 105 (1963), wherein
the court described Borden as having held that "Garmon pre-empted the field where
employees were suing unions for damages arising out of practices that were arguably
unfair labor practices••••" Local 100, Plumbers Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 698
(1963) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 1519-20, suggesting that later developments have rendered the reasoning in Gonzales "obsolete";
Note, 40 NoTRE DAME LA.w. 112 (1964).
40. For discussion of the relative merits of the judicial and administrative remedies,
see, e.g., .Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 1470•72, 1485, 1497, 1514-15; Cox, supra note 5, at
172-78; Rosen, Individual Worker in the Grievance Procedure, Still .A.nother Look at
the Problem, 24 MD. L REY. 288, 286-91 (1964).
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forum for a worker to control his own suit, to plead his case to a
jury, and to obtain an unlimited damage remedy may be very attractive to one who is seriously injured by his union's conduct. In the
principal case, for example, a sympathetic jury awarded the plaintiff
his full back pay plus $3,300 in punitive damages. Such a result
would have been impossible if the NLRB were accorded exclusive
jurisdiction.
Since both the administrative and the judicial forums afford certain unique advantages to the aggrieved individual, it would appear
that a desirable solution to the principal question would be concurrent jurisdiction in cases involving questions of fair representation. Such a solution can be achieved only if the Miranda theory is
retained as a source of Labor Board jurisdiction but is stripped of
its potential authority as a mandatory pre-emptive force. In order
to reach this result, it would be necessary to bring fair representation actions within an exception to the general pre-emption rule.
The Missouri Supreme Court attained precisely this end in the
principal case through reliance on the Gonzales exception. However,
application of Gonzales in this manner is not only legally questionable, as was demonstrated above, but it is also undesirable as a
matter of policy. The doctrine of pre-emption was designed to eliminate the assertion of jurisdiction by diverse state judicial forums
which could frustrate the evolution of a uniform federal labor law.
Under the Gonzales exception, the state courts are free to apply their
own law. 41 It is true, of course, that if section 9 of the NLRA is
regarded as the exclusive source of the duty of fair representation,
federal law would govern in all forums. However, there is no certainty that a particular state court will not view the duty in terms
of common law concepts of tort or contract.42
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Humphrey v.
Moore 43 suggests a possible solution to the principal problem which
would assure the aggrieved individual access to both the administrative and the judicial forum while facilitating the development of
a uniform federal labor policy. In Humphrey, an employee, threatened with discharge as a result of an agreement between his union
and employer by which the seniority rights of employees of two
41. See Local 100, Plumbers Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963); Local 207, Int'!
Ass'n of .Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963).
42. See note 4 supra. In Borden, for instance, the injured member based his
damage action against the union on state law and the state court relied on Gonzales
to sustain judicial jurisdiction. On appeal, the Supreme Court indicated that such
an application of state law was undesirable and, consequently, narrowed Gonzales
to its present limited status. It is, in fact, unclear what law the Missouri court ad•
ministered in the principal case. There was no mention of § 9 or of the duty of
fair representation. In Gonzales, which the court found to control its decision, the
state court had construed the member's suit to be based on a common law contractual
theory and had applied state law.
43. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
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merging companies were to be dovetailed, charged that the union
and employer had exceeded the powers granted them by the collective bargaining contract in negotiating the agreement and that the
union, by acting dishonestly and discriminantly in the bargaining
process, had violated its duty of fair representation. The Court observed that there are differing views as to whether breach of the duty
of fair representation is an unfair labor practice but upheld its
jurisdiction over the fair representation claim on the ground that
even if a section 8 violation were present, the complaint stated a
cause of action under section 301 of the LMRA and was, therefore,
within an established exception to the general pre-emption doctrine. 44 Section 301 authorizes federal jurisdiction over suits for violation of contracts between a labor union and employer.45 Thus,
construing Humphrey most broadly, it could be inferred that the
duty of fair representation is derived from the collective bargaining
agreement and that, consequently, any breach of the duty will give
rise to a section 301 action. 46 Since all section 301 actions, whether
in a state or federal court,47 are exclusively subject to federal law, 48
such a construction of Humphrey would represent an attractive solution to the principal problem. A fair representation suit could be
maintained in a judicial forum, despite the existence of concurrent
jurisdiction in the NLRB, and the decision of the court would
necessarily be rendered in accord with federal labor policy. One
federal district court has adopted this approach to sustain judicial
jurisdiction in a situation similar to the principal case, holding
that an unfair representation suit by an employee, based upon his
union's refusal to process a grievance, states a claim under section
301.40
44. Sec note 23 supra and accompanying text.
45. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 30I(a), 61 Stat. 156
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
46. The majority opinion did not expressly advance the theory that the duty of
fair representation is derived from the collective bargaining agreement. However,
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg seemed to indicate that this may have
been the majority rationale. Mr. Justice Goldberg, arguing that the plaintiff's claim
could not be brought under § 301, asserted that the duty of fair representation is
not derived from the collective bargaining agreement but implied from the federal
labor statutes. He then proceeded to the merits of the case, thereby indicating that
he does not consider .Miranda to have pre-emptive effect. On the other hand, Mr. Justice
Harlan, who agreed that no § 301 cause of action was stated, refused to consider the
merits and suggested that the case be set for reargument on the pre-emption question.
For strong criticism of the Humphrey decision, see Van Zile, The Componential
Structure of Labor Management Relations, 43 U. DET. L.J. 321, 341-53 (1966).
47. It is established that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal
courts to hear § 301 actions, Dowd Box v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1961), and that an
individual may sue under § 301 to enforce the collective bargaining agreement, Smith
v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
48. Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucus Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
49. Mandel v. Local 707, Teamsters Union, 246 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); cf.
Falsetti v. Local 2026, Ul\f\V, 355 F.2d 658 (3d Cir. 1966); Freedman v. National
Maritime Union, 347 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1965); Tully v. Fred Olson Motor Serv., 27
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This broad construction of Humphrey, bringing all fair representation actions under section 301, may not be totally warranted. The
Humphrey court stressed heavily two factual matters which, if construed as limitations on the application of section 301 to fair representation cases, would significantly narrow the scope of the decision and would, arguably, preclude use of a section 301 theory to
sustain judicial jurisdiction in the principal case. First, the court
appeared to deem it necessary that the employer be implicated in
the union's breach of duty. 50 However, the strained manner in
which the court ultimately found employer complicity would seem
to render this requirement insignificant; the employer was concededly a neutral in the union-employee dispute, was free from any
charge of actual fraud, and was connected to the union's alleged
misconduct only by the fact that he had continued to negotiate the
agreement while on constructive notice of the union's bad faith. 51
It would appear difficult for the employer to escape this type of implication by any behavior short of clear opposition to the union's
position. 52 The second factual matter stressed by the court was the
existence of an actual breach of a specific provision of the collective
bargaining contract brought about as a result of the union's breach
of duty. 53 The court pointed out that the unfair representation, if
proved, would render the dovetailing agreement a nullity and make
any displacement of employees pursuant to the agreement a breach
of contract. However, if the unfair representation alone is not a
breach of contract, it hardly seems reasonable that a resultant or
associated contract violation by the employer should transform the
union's conduct into a proper subject for a section 301 action. Because of these unresolved factors, the precise scope of the Humphrey
decision is presently unclear and will remain so until the Supreme
Court faces a situation, like that in the principal case, in which an
employee sues his union for breach of the duty of fair representation
Wis. 2d 476, 134 N.W.2d 393 (1965). See also Zeaner v. Local 107, Teamsters Union,
234 F. Supp. 901 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Addeo v. Dairymen's League, 47 Misc. 2d 426, 262
N.Y.S.2d 771 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
50. One federal district court has expressly adopted the view that a fair representation claim may not be based on § 301 if the employer is not joined in the action.
Mendicki v. UAW, 61 L.R.R.M. 2142 (D. Kan. 1965). But see Mandel v. Local 707,
Teamsters Union, 246 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Rosen, Fair Representation,
Contract Breach and Fiduciary Obligations: Unions, Union Officials and the Worker
in Collective Bargaining, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 391, 413-14 (1964); Note, Section 301 and
the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1238 (1965).
51. The majority opinion in Humphrey characterized the employer as considering
"the dispute a matter for the union to decide" and Mr. Justice Goldberg in concurrence
described the employer as having "not willfully participated in the alleged breach of
the union's duty."
52. See Rosen, supra note 4, at 413-14.
53. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Sterling, 54 CCH Lab. Cas. ,r 11430 (8th
Cir. 1966), affirming Woody v. Sterling Aluminum Prods., Inc., 243 F. Supp. 755 (E.D.
Mo. 1965); see Chasis v. Progress Mfg. Co., 54 CCH Lab. Cas. ,r 11398 (E.D. Pa. 1966);
cf. Longshoremen v. Kuntz, 334 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1964); Fuller v. Local 107, Teamsters
Union, 233 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
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without joining the employer and without alleging any other breach
of contract.r;4
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the principal
case. 65 In view of the Court's narrow construction of the Gonzales
exception in Borden, it would appear unlikely that the Missouri
Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the exception will be approved. If the Court does, in fact, find Gonzales inapposite, it will
then be faced with the problems raised by the Miranda decision.
The Court might find that Miranda is legally unsound, in which
case, the Missouri court's holding would be affirmed for lack of any
theory upon which to base pre-emption. On the other hand, if the
Court approves Miranda and construes it so as to make pre-emption
mandatory in all fair representation cases, the Missouri court will
necessarily be reversed. If the Court chooses to extend the Humphrey
decision to its outer limits, bringing all fair representation actions
under section 301, then two further alternatives are suggested:
The Court could once again avoid passing upon Miranda by holding
that section 301 creates a judicially cognizable cause of action regardless of the presence or absence of an unfair labor practice; or more
satisfactorily, the Court could recognize Miranda as a viable source
of labor board jurisdiction in fair representation cases but utilize
section 301 to give the courts concurrent jurisdiction. The latter
solution would provide the aggrieved individual with access to both
administrative and judicial forms while assuring that all decisions
are kept within a framework of uniform national labor policy. 56
54. See Murphy, The Duty of Fair Representation Under Taft-Hartley, 30 Mo. L.
REV. 373, 387 (1965).
55. 85 Sup. Ct. 186 (1966). Two distinct issues were certified: (1) whether the NLRB
has exclusive jurisdiction over a union member's damage action against union officers;
and (2) if the Board does not have exclusive jurisdiction, whether federal law authorizes a court or jury to give damages solely on the basis of testimony going to the
merits of the grievance, in the absence of proof of bad faith or discrimination, or
whether the courts are limited to directing the grievance to be arbitrated. Id. at 1863.
56. There is an alternative approach to the principal case which might arguably
be employed to avoid the pre-emption problems created by an analysis in terms of
the duty of fair representation. Section 9 of the NLRA provides that any individual
employee shall have the right to have grievances adjusted without the interference
of the bargaining representative as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Read literally, this provision
would appear to give the employee an indefeasible interest in the grievance procedure. However, the courts have refused to so construe the section and have
consistently denied the individual any right to make an employer hear his grievance
or to enforce submission of a grievance to arbitration. See, e.g., Black-Clawson v.
International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962); Palnau v. Detroit Edison
Co., 301 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1962); Rosen, Individual Worker in the Grievance Procedure, Still Another Look at the Problem, 24 Mn. L. REV. 233 (1964); Summers, supra
note 5. But see Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963), wherein the
New Jersey Supreme Court held that § 9 does give the individual a right to adjust
his grievance, that this right is implicit in the bargaining contract, and that refusal
by a union or an employer to honor the right is a breach of the contract giving rise to
an action under § 301. If this approach were adopted, a member's suit against his
union based upon the union's failure to process his grievance fully or to allow him
opportunity to adjust his grievance would be clearly within judicial jurisdiction.

